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ABSTRACT
The geographical focus in studying the environmental-migration nexus has been placed 
mainly to the areas of origin of migrants and to the question how climate stresses 
functions as a push factor for out-migration. Less attention has been paid to migrants 
facing environmental risks in the destinations areas, particularly urban agglomerations. 
Metropolitan areas not only have to keep in step with the fast growth. Since metropolises 
are often located in delta and coastal regions, they can also show an enhanced risk for 
natural hazards. Therefore, this paper addresses the question of how vulnerable rural-
urban migrants in the Greater Bangkok Metropolitan Area deal with urban natural disasters. 
The aim of this exploratory study is to capture the experiences of internal migrants with 
the floods of 2011. Salaya, a fast growing sub-district in Nakhon Pathom province in the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Area was severely inundated over weeks, also for the purpose of 
protecting central Bangkok. In order to identify coping strategies with the big floods in 
2011 and adaptation strategies to potential future floods, 17 metropolitan migrants and 
4 key informants have been interviewed in depth in Thai with the help of interpreters. To 
understand the motives behind distinct strategies, a focus on the concepts of translocality 
and riskscapes in the light of previous experiences in the places of origin was set. 
KEYWORDS: Risk, Flood, Migration, Thailand, Bangkok Metropolitan Area, Adaptation
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„My hometown is very dry - there is no rain. I feel like I’m living in another world.“
(Woman, originally from South Thailand, living in Bangkok Metropolitan Region since 2009)
1  Introduction
Since the 2000s there has been a growing focus on conceptualizing migration as a stra-
tegy of adaptation (McLeman & Smit, 2006; Black et al., 2011), moving away from en-
vironmentalist approaches viewing environment or its degradation as a single cause of 
migration (Westing, 1992; Hugo, 1996; Myers, 2002). The geographical focus has thereby 
mainly been placed to the areas of origin of migrants (Findlay, 2011) and less attenti-
on has been paid to migrants’ livelihoods and resilience in destinations areas and their 
attempts to adapt to unfamiliar environmental hazards. Often times such destination 
areas are metropolitan urban centers, which in many countries especially in the Global 
South are hotspots of big societal and ecological challenges (UN-Habitat, 2011). 
1.1 Bangkok: Interplay of Mass Urbanization & Natural Hazards
 
Unplanned mass urbanization processes and increasing vulnerability to natural hazards 
expose megacities to dual stresses (DePaul, 2012) which even reinforce each other. Ina-
dequate infrastructures can intensify the risks that metropolises are facing due to their 
geographical characteristics. Since many metropolitan cities are located in delta and 
coastal regions, they naturally show an enhanced risk for natural hazards. 
So does Bangkok, the political capital, financial, industrial and cultural center of Thailand. 
Internal migration movements in Thailand have been a common response to changes in 
the socio-ecological fabric of the country in the recent decades. The ongoing agrarian 
change, especially in Northeast Thailand can be seen from changing patterns of farming 
practices, complexification of traditional household structures and the role of non-farm 
based income and mobility in livelihoods since the 1980s (Rigg & Salamanca, 2009; Rigg 
et al., 2012). Primarily directed towards the capital (IOM, 2011), Bangkok underwent a 
massive population growth, which amounts to 14.5 million people currently living in 
the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) (NSO, 2010). Located in the Chao Phraya delta, 
Bangkok has traditionally been an aquatic settlement (Massmann, 2015) in which the 
inhabitants cultivated the deltaic environment according to annual overflowing of the 
Chao Phraya River (Chiplunkar et al., 2012). Delta development towards reduction of 
seasonal constraints (Lebel et al., 2010) initiated structural landform transformation, like 
the construction of canals (khlongs), and water became increasingly a subject to control 
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(Kono & Saha, 1995). Since the 1960s, Bangkok’s rapidly growing population induced an 
enormous expansion of the city, which is characterized by uncontrolled urbanization 
processes and overstretched infrastructures (Massmann, 2015).  By shifting paddy fields 
to urban dwellings (Hara et al., 2005), rebuilding traditional houses on stilts to modern 
townhouses and converting khlongs to streets (Massmann, 2015) water as societies’ life-
lines got gradually lost and increasingly became a threat for the city.
Seasonal monsoon rains and northwest Pacific tropical cyclones (Gale & Saunders, 2013) 
endanger Bangkok regularly to flood hazards. Land subsidence due to over extraction 
of groundwater (Chiplunkar et al., 2012), predictions of sea level rise (BMA et al., 2009), 
and an increase in basin mean precipitation (World Bank, 2009) due to climate change, 
pose an additional long-term challenge to the city. With 60% of built-up land area, the 
city is predominantly shaped by impervious surfaces, that significantly increase volume 
and surface runoff of rainwater and hinder shallow and deep infiltration (Saraswat et al., 
2016). Furthermore, the city’s location along the natural waterway creates a bottleneck 
in times of large upstream runoff due to heavy rainfall in northern Thailand and the Chao 
Phraya River basin (BMA et al., 2009) in the monsoon season. Inflow from surrounding 
areas, tidal effects from the Gulf of Thailand and the low gradient hinder the floodwater 
to drain off rapidly additionally (Chiplunkar et al., 2012; Liew et al., 2016). Urbanization, 
economic growth and industrial centralization increased the damage potential in num-
ber of people and economic value additionally (Lebel et al., 2011; Takeuchi, 2001).
 
1.2 Bangkok and the Floods of 2011
 
To date, water management is mostly of technocratic nature with focus on infrastructu-
res (Marks, 2015). Since 1980, Bangkok was affected by 8 severe floods in total in 1980, 
1983, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2011 (World Bank, 2009, 2012) despite the comple-
tion of two large dam projects, Bhumibol Dam (1964) and Sirikit Dam (1971), which were 
supposed to reduce flood risks (World Bank, 2009). Further prevention measures include 
the construction of flood barriers (floodwalls, dykes, road and railway embankments, 
elevation of buildings), measures to discharge water (pumping stations, water gates, 
tunnels, sewers, drainage canals), and retaining rainwater temporarily in retention bas-
ins and monkey cheeks (BMA et al., 2009). After the floods of 1983, the massive embank-
ment of the King’s Dyke was built to protect the city center by diverting floodwater to 
the east (Liew et al., 2016). 
In 2011, years of water mismanagement, political competition and administrative de-
cisions (Marks, 2015) culminated in a massive flood disaster, which was in Kraas words 
a “calamity of civilization” (2012:58). Thailand’s worst flood in recent history (World 
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Bank, 2012) began with excessive rainfall of an early starting and powerful continu-
ing southwest monsoon with record precipitation in March and April (Gale & Saunders, 
2013). Following four tropical storms, the upstream dams Sirikit and Bhumibol exceeded 
their capacities in September and October (Komori et al., 2012), resulting in numerous 
subsequent structural breakdowns of levees, dykes and water gates (Koontanakulvong, 
2014). The floodwater inundated more than six million hectares of land, caused more 
than 800 deaths, displaced more than 165.000 people at the peak (UN, 2011 quoted 
according to World Bank, 2012) and affected more than 13 million people from July 
through December (World Bank, 2012). In total, damages and losses were amounted to 
USD 46.5 billion and USD 50 billion were estimated to be needed for rehabilitation and 
reconstruction (World Bank, 2012).
In order to protect the capital and avoid a symbolic collapse, management actions of the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Administration diverted the masses of water into the northern 
and western areas of the BMR transforming them intentionally into retention areas 
(Marks, 2015; Sophonpanich, 2011). These actions not only revived urban-rural tensions 
and political polarization in the country (Dalpino, 2012). As Chomsri and Sherer (2013) 
report, industrial zones have received more flood protection and social services, leaving 
peripheries and marginalized groups more exposed to the incoming flood waters. Aid 
was also distributed unevenly, since “getting assistance depended on power relations 
[…] social connection determined aid” (Chomsri & Sherer, 2013:496). Worsening the si-
tuation further, the residents of the BMR were left to speculate and cope in midst of vast 
amounts of contradictory information and instruction provided by public and online 
sources (Sophonpanich, 2011).
1.3 Social Cohesion in Times of Floods
Water management in the Central Plains was characterized by uncoordinated actions 
due to unclear responsibilities of governmental institutions (Lebel et al., 2011), cau-
sing an increasing and uneven distribution of flood risks (Marks & Lebel, 2016). Flood 
vulnerabilities are dependent on which side of structural flood prevention measures 
settlements are located (i.e. inside or outside the King’s Dyke) (Marks, 2015), on district 
jurisdictions (Lebel et al., 2011; Limthongsakul et al., 2017), on an urban-periphery-axis 
(Lebel et al., 2011) and on socio-economic conditions and governance power (Marks, 
2015). In the lack of an inclusive flood governance, reactionary crisis management and 
simplified promises of the authorities (Lebel et al., 2011) force many neighborhoods 
to autonomous, personalized adaptations, which in turn can shift flood risks from one 
location to another (Ng, 2016; Limthongsakul et al., 2017). In coping with floods, infor-
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mal networks are a very valuable resource in Thailand (Ng, 2016). In 2011, social cohesi-
on went hand in hand with a more effective flood governance and relief support (Wor-
ld Bank, 2012). Although collaborative coping strategies took place in rural and urban 
communities alike, i.e. moving household items, giving a ride in a boat, or cooking for 
the more vulnerable, collaborative behavior tended to be less prevalent in urban areas 
(World Bank, 2012). Especially in densely populated areas, i.e. close to markets, “[t]the 
absence of community networks further impacts the distribution of aid with greater 
potential for particular sub-groups to be excluded” (World Bank, 2012:225). 
Characteristics of a densely populated urban environment, centralization of the eco-
nomy, systematic political bias and less social cohesion are important features that sha-
pe flood risks of a metropolis like Bangkok and set them apart from rural settlements. In 
this context, rural-urban, or to be more specific, metropolitan migrants are a very inte-
resting group to study scope of action of coping and adaptation strategies to challenges 
of urban floods in a novel environment and in the light of possible former rural flood 
experiences. In an exploratory approach, the project Migrants at risk seeks to assess the 
role of migration in coping with and adapting to natural hazards in destination areas. 
It therefore focuses on the experiences of internal Thai migrants in Salaya, a suburban 
town in Bangkok’s periphery, with the big floods of 2011.
 2. Conceptual Background
 2.1 Habitat-Specific Riskscapes
Regarding the variety of challenges rural-urban migrants have to face when they de-
cide to leave their homes, unknown environmental risks in destination areas (Guadag-
no, 2016) attract little attention. Dwellings embed humans not only in physical spaces 
with distinct biotic and abiotic environments, but also in specific social and economic 
structures that create a locally specific habitat. Disasters can “destroy or undermine life 
support, the resources and established arrangements for producing and distributing 
supplies, and the relations with the habitat and surrounding communities” (Hewitt, 
1997:36). The human habitat though is neither ahistorical nor consistent over time, but 
a “space for developing habits” (Bastons & Armengou, 2016) based on learning and ca-
pabilities. Over time, residents thus develop certain knowledge about the individual 
living environment, that includes strategies of habitat-specific adaptations (Boyd et al., 
2011) to environmental hazards. In times of environmental risks, local knowledge can be 
essential to subsist successfully (Boyd et al., 2011), as “people respond to risk in relation 
to their broader experiential and synthetic knowledge about the place they live in, their 
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expectations in terms of political power and quality of life, as well as their understanding 
of how the risks they are exposed to are being managed” (Sutherland et al., 2012:48). 
However, migration does not proceed in an unbiased way. Migrants do carry knowled-
ge and narratives that were being formed in their homes into a new locality, that also 
shape the notion of environmental risks (Sutherland et al., 2012). Following “landscapes 
of violence” (Hewitt, 1997:36), “riskscapes” (Sutherland et al., 2012) do not only emerge 
from a particular territory, but also through practices carried out (Müller-Mahn & Everts, 
2013) and livelihoods embedded in a certain habitat (Hewitt, 1997). Since habitat- and 
livelihood-specific riskscapes influence decisions that are being made in stressful situa-
tions, they are crucial for handling risks during habitat-shocks. That way, migrants are a 
particular group at risk firstly, if they are unfamiliar with localized adaptation strategies 
and secondly, if individual riskscapes in the adjustment of a hazardous situation leads to 
misleading assessments and actions.
We are using the habitat concept in this work to highlight the holistic understanding of 
the living environment and to acknowledge that every living environment does have 
specific features that set it apart from others - even if they are situated in the same 
country. The latter is important to consider, as not only international but even internal 
migrants could struggle with cultural, administrative and language barriers that increa-
se their vulnerability to natural hazards (IOM, 2015).
2.2 Translocality
The emerging concept of translocality provides a framework to understand migrant 
experiences beyond common dichotomies such as rural and urban, and helps the re-
search place an emphasis on transformation of local communities and environments 
(Greiner & Sakdapolrak, 2013). Mobility does not necessarily exclude migrants from their 
old homes. It rather “stretches the locales […] beyond places” (Sakdapolrak et al., 2016), 
embedding internal migrants in what is termed as translocal networks. Strong trans-
local linkages can offer a “diverse pool of opportunities” (Guadagno, 2016) and resour-
ces (Frayne, 2005). Increased mobility and new technology further facilitate this inter-
connectedness (Panagakos & Horst, 2006), and enable material and symbolic flows and 
circulations (Greiner & Sakdapolrak, 2013). 
An ethnographic study of international migration and intergenerational dynamics in 
central Peru by Long (2009) calls for the need of more migration studies that capture 
“multiplicity and interconnectedness of different types of spatial and geographical mo-
vement and livelihoods” (Long, 2009:61). The study concludes that “[the families’] life 
courses intersect through the translocal dynamics of familial reproduction and change” 
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(Long, 2009:61). It empirically illustrates that translocality can contribute to develop-
ment processes not only in places of origin and for those left behind. Reflecting on 
this, translocality could furthermore provide an exit to local hazard exposure and con-
sequently decrease vulnerability of those affected in destination areas. 
When the above concepts are taken together, one’s translocal network could therefo-
re shape one’s riskscapes and translocal safety nets could expand coping capacities of 
migrants in times of environmental risks and adaptation capacities to environmental 
hazards in the long-term.
3. Method
3.1 Study Site
 
To study the interplay between population movement and urban environmental risks 
in the context of the floods of 2011 in Thailand, the research took place in Salaya, a 
sub-district of Phutthamonthon district in Nakhon Pathom province. Salaya is a popu-
lar destination for internal migrants and expands very fast. Center of people’s lives is 
the campus of Mahidol University, which creates various sources of income, especially 
for small-scale businesses in the food and service sector. A train station connects to 
Bangkok to the east and makes way to Southern Thailand to the west. Although its fast 
growth is visible in numerous construction sites, one will still find green landscapes 
of rice paddies to the north and a Buddha park (Phutthamonthon park) to the south. 
Due to its low-lying positioning and as a consequence of protecting central Bangkok, 
like other peripheries of the BMR, Salaya was severely inundated over several weeks 
from the end of October until December. The population of Salaya, estimated at 2,311 
households in 2011, was highly affected by the floods with varying degrees of loss and 
damage (Sakulsri et al., 2015).
The flood reached Salaya in two waves. On October 26th, the water masses broke in on 
the residents at night. One day later, Mahidol University announced urgent evacuation 
to its students and staff (Bangkok Post, 2011; Thailand Flood Crisis Information Map, 
2011). The water initially reaches knee level until water held up by the railways breaks 
loose on October 29th. The second wave inundated the new and old markets and made 
living on the ground floor impossible in most parts of Salaya.
With its structural protections from the flood and proximity to the Salaya train station, 
Mahidol University acted as an aid center for food and shelter for a few nights, in additi-
on to other buildings such as condos and public offices. Armed forces and local offices 
were mobilized to distribute basic needs to households during the inundated weeks. 
And even the crown prince and his former wife distributed aid packages to Salaya’s re-
sidents.
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Figure1:  Street map of the BMR (on the left) and Salaya subdistrict, Phutthamonthon, Nakhon Pathom 
province  (on the right). 
Source: Formatted and customized on a public street map available on http://opendata.arcgis.com/. 
Base map source: Esri, HERE, DeLorme, USGS, Intermap, INCREMENT P, NRCan, Esri Japan, METI, Esri 
China (Hong Kong), Esri Korea, Esri (Thailand), MapmyIndia, NGCC, OpenStreetMap contributors, and the 
GIS User Community.
3.2 In-Depth Interviews
 
Approaching the experiences of internal migrants residing in Salaya during the floods, 
in-depth interviews with 17 migrants, 4 key informants, of which 1 spontaneously was 
extended to a group interview of locals with 3 neighbors joining, were conducted in 
Thai language with the help of three local research assistants, who interpreted between 
the 2 interviewers and the interviewees. Interviews with local community leaders and 
neighborhood social workers were the starting point of inquiry in order to inform and 
refine the interview questions.
Potential interview participants were contacted in public spaces such as streets, mar-
kets and outside and inside the university campus and chosen according to their migra-
tion background and Salaya as place of residence. Snowball sampling was tried to be 
avoided if homogeneity was obvious, i.e. if interview partners recommended persons of 
the same region of origin.
A short questionnaire in the beginning introduced the participants to the interview 
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process and helped gather background information systematically. Each interview with 
migrants was initiated with a leading question “Can you describe me, how your daily 
life looked like during the floods?” to encourage narratives. The necessity of employing 
interpreters however hindered fluency in parts and made detailed inquiry essential. In 
order to enhance the communication between the researchers and participants, maps 
of Thailand and Salaya were used alongside the interviews.
3.3 Analysis
 
The English translation of the interviews was transcribed and coded in accordance to 
the developed theoretical framework and enriched with categories coming up during 
the empirical work (marked with asterisk). The categories are listed and described in 
Table 1. Additionally, it is also worth noting that the quotations provided below in the 
findings sections were structurally edited by the authors to provide preciseness.
3.4 Methodological Concerns over Political Sensitivity of the Topic
 
Associated with political tensions and societal polarization, the floods of 2011 is a sen-
sitive topic, especially when it comes to governmental decisions and responsibilities. In 
Chintraruk and Walsh’s (2016:201) words, “(t)he political divisions within the country si-
gnified by the red versus yellow conflicts were replicated within the civil service and the 
important institutions of the state”. From a disaster governance perspective, such divisi-
ons have undermined the authorities’ ability to mitigate and respond to the event. It is 
therefore not surprising that we often sensed discomfort when the topics start to touch 
upon governmental responsibilities in flood management in our interviews. Although 
many interviewees blamed the government for the extent of the flood disaster in 2011, 
when asked though about potential future flood disasters and the government’s role 
in preventing them, many answered in the same neutral manner: “This won’t happen 
again, because the government has learned”. Few that have spoken up about the topic 
have done so in an indirect manner, questioning first the inability and secondly, the in-
effectiveness of the responsible authorities in responding to the floods.
Since Thailand’s society is still under the administration of the military junta, methodo-
logical concerns over the possible impacts of modern Thai politics on research credibi-
lity and academic freedom has in fact gained attention in a recent symposium on Thai 
studies (Thai Studies Symposium, 2016). In this regard, we question the reliability of 
the expressions we collected on the topic of governance and therefore have decided to 
exclude those parts from our findings.
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Categories Operationalization of Categories
Pre -flo o d
Migration history Decisions, behavior, circumstances that lead to the distinct migration pattern/
decision
Awareness Information related to the hazard before the hazard came and access to this in-
formation
Waiting for floods/preparation Activities, actions taken while waiting for the floods, this can include prepara-
tions
Former experiences Previous experiences with floods and/or any other water-related hazard
Worries and difficulties Anticipation and worries while waiting for the floods
D uring the f lo o d
Impact/intensity of flood How the flood started – speed and amount of water (exposure)
Coping strategies: in situ Strategies that people follow to “overcome immediate threats by the means of 
those resources that are directly available “ (Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013)
Coping strategies: mobility Mobility strategies – moving to upper floor, hometown, friends’ homes, family in 
Salaya or other places
Support/aid/resources used to 
cope
Offer and use of assistance from the wider socio-political arena (civil society, go-
vernmental organizations, NGOs…) and informal support that helped deal with 
flood
Translocal structures Interconnectedness, overlapping networks, social capital that helped deal with 
the hazard. Remote interactions that have influenced action (Greiner & Sakd-
apolrak, 2013)
Information on floods* Information on the current state of the floods, water level etc. and access to this 
information
Attitude, perception of the 
floods*
Awareness, perception and sensitivity to the hazard that influenced coping stra-
tegies
Waiting for the floods to retreat Activities/actions taken while waiting for the floods to retreat, this includes fin-
ding work outside of Salaya
Distribution of the flood Spatial distribution of the flood water
Others/sense of community* Awareness of the overall wellbeing/loss of the Salaya community and neighbor-
hood during the floods and stories heard of others
Af ter  the f lo o d
Return and/or recovery When and how returned to Salaya and/or how recovered
Losses and damages Losses and damages caused by the floods. The overall cost of it where applicable
Livelihood, everyday life Livelihoods post-flooding – occupation disruption/recovery, commuting/use of 
urban infrastructure etc.
Aftermath aid/support/compen-
sation
Offer and use of assistance from the wider socio-political arena and informal 
support that help to deal with loss and damage
Causes of the flood – natural vs 
water management*
Opinions and explanations regarding the causes of floods and its intensity/level, 
duration
Adaptation strategy “Measures that people employ to learn from past experiences, anticipate future 
risks and adjust their livelihoods accordingly” (Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013)
Risk management Risk management on political, community level to prevent future floods
Reflection on coping strategies/
decisions taken in 2011*
Reflection/satisfaction with coping strategies/decisions taken in 2011 in retros-
pect
Changes in future coping strate-
gies/actions
Changes in behavior, planned actions to be undertaken during a potential simil-
ar hazard to decrease exposure and/or vulnerability; or same/similar actions that 
are planned to be undertaken during a potential similar hazard
Future floods Opinions on the probability and/or intensity of future floods
Suggestions for the future Direct suggestions for improvements to prevent future risks – for community, 
municipality and government
Table 1:  List of categories and operationalization used in data analysis
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4. Findings
Figure 2 illustrates the regions of origin of our interviewees - Southern, Eastern, Northeast, 
Northern, and rural regions of Central Thailand. Background data, former experiences 
with floods and coping strategies of the interviewees are summarized in table 2.
Figure 2:  Map of Thailand illustrating provinces of origin (in dark grey) of research participants and pro-
vince of destination - Nakhon Pathom (in light orange). 
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4.1 Habitat-Specific and Translocally Constructed Riskscapes
In contrast to provinces further north, the geographical location of Nakhon Pathom 
province gave the residents of Salaya time to follow the news on the expansion of the 
floods. Although most of the interviewees had been well informed about the upcoming 
hazard about 2 weeks before, many did not instantly anticipate that the waters would 
reach Salaya. It was apparent in the interviews that the information given about the 
extent of the floods, didn’t automatically translate into adequate judgements of the si-
tuation. Confusing official statements and chaotic flood management made it certainly 
difficult to assess the situation appropriately. Moreover, since the causes of the floods 
were rooted outside of Salaya, they were neither locally visible nor naturally explainab-
le, which impinged upon people’s risk awareness additionally:
“I heard on the news but there was no rain at all.” (Migrant 3)
“It was a day with sun and the [blue] sky and no rain, but the water came.” (Migrant 9)
As table 3 illustrates, information alone wasn’t the single factor that influenced risk 
perceptions. Uncoordinated actions by the authorities made it necessary to rely on in-
dividual riskscapes, which were primarily formed by former experiences. Thereby both, 
experiences with floods and lack of experiences played a role. Since none of the inter-
nal migrants interviewed had experienced floods in their new habitat before, two diffe-
rent frames of references informed their riskscapes. One was formed accordingly to the 
knowledge of most migrants, by which Salaya never had been affected by floods before. 
Especially those, who had no flood experiences at all counted on Salaya’s safeness. Tho-
se, however, who were highly experienced with floods in their home provinces - prima-
rily people coming from the South - explicitly referred to them. 
However, riskscapes were not only locally constructed and habitat-specifically infor-
med, moreover riskscapes were also influenced by translocal structures. Especially less 
experienced migrants integrated risk perceptions from afar in their risk assessment. The-
rewith although not directly affected by the floods, translocal networks brought in an 
outsider view that also shaped local riskscapes.
4.2 Coping Strategies: Moving in situ and Translocally
 
Table 2 summarizes coping strategies the interviewees have been employed during the 
floods. In situ actions contained lifting up belongings to elevated levels, building up 
stocks of vital commodities, moving upstairs, to other accommodations or to relative’s 
or friend’s homes, parking cars at secure places and in few cases implementing protecti-
on measures to the house. Although migrants with greater flood experiences were 
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Participant Age 
Group
Gender Home Province Education Migration 
to Salaya 
(year)
Occupation 
(mobile / 
immobile)*
House 
flooded 
in 2011
Coping strategies taken 
during 2011 floods
Dura-
tion of 
staying 
away
Opinion about 
potential similar 
floods**
M1 40-49 f Suphanburi higher 
education
2005 Public 
(immobile)
no parking car in hometown, retun-
ing to Salaya and escaping to ho-
metown as soon as the University 
closed
1 month, 
10 days
within the next 20 
years
M2 40-49 f Suratthani secondary 
level
2005 Business (im-
mobile)
no using bricks, sandbags and a 
pump to protect the house, buil-
ding up food stocks, receiving aid 
packages, buying and selling boat
- within the next 10 
years
M3 50-59 f Nakhonsriham-
marat
elemetary 
level
2009 Business (im-
mobile)
yes moving stuff in 2nd floor, esca-
ping to hometown and living on 
2nd floor after returning, recei-
ving aid packages
2 weeks within the next 20 
years
M4 20-29 f Ubon Ratchahani higher 
education
2011 Business (im-
mobile)
yes moving to 2nd apartment in 
Bangkok, going to hometown 
temporarily and back to apart-
ment in Bangkok
n/a never
M5 40-49 f Nakhonsriham-
marat
elemetary 
level
2009 Business (mo-
bile)
yes building up food stocks, moving 
to cousin in Bangkok, escaping to 
hometown and moving regularly 
between relatives and friends 
after returning
3 months never
M6 40-49 f Nongkhai elemetary 
level
2001 Business (mo-
bile)
yes lifting up stuff to the roof, esca-
ping to hometown, splitting up 
family and to different places
2 months never
M7 50-59 m Suphanburi elemetary 
level
2003 Service 
(mobile)
yes moving to student apartment un-
der construction for three nights, 
staying for 20 days, receiving aid 
packages, escaping to hometown
1 month not sure
M8 40-49 f Utradit secondary 
level
2009 Service 
(immobile)
yes moving immediately to another 
apartment in Salaya, escaping to 
husband’s hometown as soon as 
the University closed
6 months within the next 10 
years
M9 50-59 m Nakhonsriham-
marat
secondary 
level
1999 Business (mo-
bile)
yes escaping to hometown 2 months never
Table 2:  Outline of background data of participants, their experiences with floods and applied coping strategies during the floods of 2011
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M10 30-39 m Phatthatung higher 
education
2010 Public 
(immobile)
yes moving from 1st to 3rd floor 
of the building, receiving 1 aid 
package, wife moving to Bangkok
- within the next 10 
years
M11 60-69 m Chainat higher 
education
2000 Business (im-
mobile)
yes lifting up stuff in 2nd floor and 
escaping to 2nd apartment in Pra-
chuapkhirikhan province, moving 
to relatives in Chonburi province
1 month within the next 10 
years
M12 60-69 m Surin elemetary 
level
1986 Business (mo-
bile)
yes piling stuff, moving to a house 
on the grounds of Prince Mahidol 
Palace in Salaya, receiving food 
and boat from soldiers
- not in this century
M13 20-29 f Chonburi higher 
education
2001 Business (mo-
bile)
yes moving light stuff on 2nd floor, 
sealing doors with silicon, split-
ting up family to Bangkok and 
Chonburi province
n/a within the next 10 
years
M14 50-59 m Chonburi elemetary 
level
2004 Service 
(mobile)
no building up food stocks, staying 
for one month and escaping to 
wife’s home province (Prachuapk-
hirikhan) to protect car
1 ½ 
months
never
M15 50-59 f Prachinburi elemetary 
level
2006 Business (mo-
bile)
yes packing clothes and food into bo-
xes, changing lock of apartment, 
escaping to hometown with 
selling goods, a tent and blan-
kets, moving to friend‘s place in 
Chonburi province to sell goods 
on the market
1 ½ 
months
not sure
M16 40-49 m Karasin higher 
education
1992 Public 
(immobile)
no helping to protect Mahidol 
University from flooding with so-
ilbags, receiving food donations 
and going back to hometown as 
soon as water level decreased
15 days never
M17 30-39 f Chachengsao higher 
education
2008 Public 
(immobile)
yes parking car at safe place, moving 
stuff to 2nd floor, escaping to 
hometown
3 months within the next 50 
years
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#
Table 3:  Migrants’ risk perceptions accordingly to flood experiences
Participant Region Former Flood Ex-
periences
Risk Perception: Key Quotations Risk Perception Primarily 
Based on / Formed by
M1 Central occasionally in 
hometown
I followed the news […] and I thought that the water will come, but I didn’t think it’ll come a lot or this far. information
M2 South regularly in home-
town, Tsunami 2004
The tsunami was scarier than the floods. […] We kind of know this [situation] from back home, so we pre-
pared.
experiences made in old 
habitat
M3 South annually in home-
town
In the South, we would know from the rain. If it rains, there will be floods and we can prevent. But this 
floodwater is no flood. I do not know where the water came from, the water just came.
experiences made in old 
habitat
M4 Northeast once in hometown My parents called me and said, oh my god, you have to move, you have to move, you have to move, like 
that. So, I moved […] because my parents told me so.
translocal social structures 
M5 South regularly in home-
town
I have always experienced flooding in my hometown, but my home is just close to the sea. It would be 
flooded for two to three days, then the water is gone. […] That’s why at the beginning, I didn’t move from 
Salaya. I didn’t think that it’ll flood for three months.
experiences made in old 
habitat
M6 Northeast once in hometown My mum was worried about the floods. She gave me a call and asked me to come back immediately. translocal social structures 
M7 Central none I’ve lived here for more than 10 years, I never have seen this before. On the radio, the broadcast has 
warned us […] and it’s possible that the water will flood in this area. But I myself, I didn’t belief that it’ll be 
flooded, because it wasn’t happening before. 
experiences made in local 
habitat
M8 North occasionally in 
Sukhotai, once in 
hometown
I didn’t get any information that there’ll be a flood. […] There was no signal that there will be that much 
flood.
information
M9 South n/a When I’ve heard that the water is coming, […] I drove my motorbike to check the water level every day. I 
watched the news and I also wanted to check with my eyes.  
information
M10 South regularly in home-
town
I didn’t prepare or prevent anything, because I never thought that it’ll be this much flood. […] I’m from 
the South, where the water comes only for a day and then goes to the sea. When I was a little kid, we just 
played with the water.
experiences made in old 
habitat
M11 Central plenty in different 
parts of Thailand
From my instinct, I believed that it’ll be a big flood. I was quite sure that it’ll flood, so I decided to leave 
Salaya. And it’s a good opportunity to take a break. I can go everywhere on my holidays.
higher education
M12 Northeast n/a I think I believed a little bit that it’ll be flooded but nor severe, because in my life I never faced a severe 
flood like this before.
elemetary level
M13 East none The first province I heard [that was affected] was Phitsanulok, [and when it reached] Nakhonsawan I felt 
like it was really far from me. Then I heard that the water came to Pathumthani and then to Nonburi. After 
that, I feel okay, this is real flooding.
information
M14 East none I never ever thought that Salaya will be flooded. Salaya never faced floodings before. Just only a little bit 
after raining, just a few days and then the water is gone. I never saw it before.
experiences made in local 
habitat
M15 East occasionally I was very afraid of the floods. I didn’t expect the water will come fast like that. information
M16 Northeast none From my own experience that I’ve been living here for 20 years, I would say that the water level should not 
be more than five centimeters.
experiences made in local 
habitat
M17 East none The stressful [issue] during that time was, whether the water will really come or not. Because, if we knew 
that the water is really coming, we can evacuate. [But] I could not prepare or plan anything.
information
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slightly better prepared for the floods, they likewise underestimated the event. As ris-
kscapes in simplified terms differed between no flood and two to three days of flooding 
in Salaya, preparation and prevention measures had been adjusted accordingly. In the 
following reference, an interviewee expresses how although adequate information was 
given with regards to coping in situ with the coming flood, less information was provi-
ded on the intensity and the overall magnitude of the event:  
“For the preparation of the flood, we’ve received a lot of information on the news. I think 
this was enough. But if there is another flood in the future [...], I want more information 
on the water management. The direction of the flood and amount of water that is co-
ming.” (Migrant 17)
No one was prepared for the major disaster - neither the authorities nor the population, 
and thus escaping the floods had become necessary for most of the interviewees at 
some point. Since the official flood management had been perceived as an unreliable 
source, only few evacuated before the waters reached their houses. In fact, most inter-
viewees had kept working as usual as long as possible and had reacted last minute only 
after realizing that they couldn’t maintain their livelihoods in Salaya any longer, making 
some preparation measures redundant:
“I made a decision to leave [Salaya] because I had no place to go, I had no place to live.” 
(Migrant 6)
“Actually, I could live in the house but the problem was that there was no food. I did not 
know where to get food.” (Migrant 9)
“I prepared [for the floods], but I didn’t prepare to escape. I bought a lot of food, such as 
rice, and eggs to sell.” (Migrant 5) 
Nevertheless, most interviewees were still able to leave Salaya independently by car, 
train or bus and only a few were reliant on municipal assistance like soldiers trucks for 
transportation and/or other aid from the community.
What all evacuated interviewees have in common was that they profited from networks 
outside of the flood zones. In most cases, translocal networks consisted of family mem-
bers and relatives who were still living in the migrants’ hometowns, and sometimes of 
friends that gave shelter. When space was too small to shelter the whole evacuated fa-
mily, they split up and went to different places or even provinces, accordingly to network 
maintenance, degree of relationship and working opportunities. Although many of the 
interviewees were self-employed with small, mobile businesses, such as food stands in 
the market, almost no one reacted fast enough to save their belongings and eventually 
to install it somewhere else temporarily. This meant that while migrants did evacuate 
to their hometowns, many were not able to generate income and had to become de-
pendent on their savings. A woman describes how evacuating to her hometown in the 
South was costly - there was no way to generate an income during the three months of 
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floods:
“While I lived there [hometown], I had nothing to do. I just stand still for about three 
months. […] I had to spend a lot of money because my nephew and niece went with me, 
too. And I had no job, I could not earn money there.” (Migrant 5)
Others who didn’t own their businesses, such as employees, weren’t free to leave arbit-
rarily and were dependent on the employer’s decision. As for many in Salaya, workplaces 
have been more or less associated with the university campus and therefore they were 
reliant on its operation. In worst case scenarios, wages were not paid during breakdown 
of businesses and service providers.
“I wished that at least, I would get the minimum wage or have a job during the floods.” 
(Migrant 8)
At the other end of the spectrum, those without financial worries took the flooded 
months as an opportunity to revive old relationships, maintain their social network and 
even take a vacation.
“I went back home, I didn’t do anything. I was meeting old friends. I spend a lot of money 
with my old friends and went out at night to the market. It was fun actually, I met some 
of my old friends that I haven’t seen for so long.” (Migrant 9)
“[…] in Chonburi there were a lot of places to go to visit. […] The only bad thing about 
that was that I drank too much beer. One dozen of beer every day.” (Migrant 11)
Since many followed the example of their local network, “everyone I know was going 
home, so I decided that I will go home” (Migrant 9), Salya looked “like a city without 
people living” (Migrant 12) at some point. Only few kept staying the whole time, either 
out of professional obligations (M10, M16), due to lack of monetary resources (M12) or 
because they were able to preserve their livelihood (M2). However, none of the intervie-
wees remained moved into a local public shelter.
As outlined above, riskscapes and accordingly preparation measures pointed to a geo-
graphical divide into South Thailand and the rest of the country. In contrast to translocal 
coping strategies, which didn’t indicate a distinction, in situ coping strategies revealed 
a certain southern, flood experienced pride that even provoked hazardous situations:
“[…] sometimes my son even went out and played in the flood water - played with the 
boat outside. […] when I was young I also played in the water and my mother never 
worried about me.” (Migrant 2)
“I was thinking about [staying in a shelter] […] I would say, that if you don’t have any 
experiences with floods, you might have to go to the shelter. But I come from the South 
where it is often flooded. So, I know how to handle floods and to live with floods.” 
(Migrant 3)
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4.3 Habitat-Specific Experiences in Urban Flood Disasters
As shown above, risk perceptions of the oncoming floods have to some extent been 
constructed by flood and “non-flood” experiences in former habitats. During the floods 
of 2011, the interviewees eventually have gained local knowledge about urban flood 
disasters in Salaya:
“I thought that our area is upland, but after the flooding I changed my mind, because 
our land is very low-lying.” (Migrant 13)
“And the reason why the water went to many houses, was that it was stuck by the rail 
track, and the rural highway, because they’re higher.” (Migrant 9)
Besides topographical and internal habitat-specific characteristics, Salaya was indeed 
perceived as part of a failed water management system, which is inevitably linked to 
Bangkok and its densely built-up landscape:
“They [the authorities] have chosen [the periphery] to be the waterway of the floods to 
protect Bangkok. If we let the water go down [to the ocean], it takes two days and the 
water is gone. But nowadays, there is housing and a lot of buildings and roads which 
block the waterways.” (Migrant 11)
“I think it was flooded because of two reasons. First, there are no canals for the water to 
drain off. And second, we haven’t faced a severe flooding like this for a long time. That 
made our government not to prepare and they may have not believed that there will be 
a big flood like this.” (Migrant 12)
Those experiences made in 2011 have some influence in adaptation measures to poten-
tial future floods, about which almost all participants have thought. 
4.4 Adaptation to Potential Future Floods
 
Many interviewees have expressed that they would act differently in the future. For 
some, escaping the floods by returning home no longer seems as necessary as it was in 
2011. Firstly, some moved to other accommodations like elevated houses in safer quar-
ters or two-storey houses. Secondly, many would prefer to stay in Salaya, if it is flooded 
again. Although most of the interviewees haven’t been on site when the flood waters 
reached its peak, many feel that they have gained enough experiences and knowledge 
about the progression of flood disasters in Salaya. Others refer to narratives of people 
who unlike them have remained in Salaya, and made the best out of the situation in a 
collaborative behavior:
“Next time, I would not go anywhere. I want to see. Because I’ve heard people saying 
that it was fun. Because people around here were eating together. So, actually […] [that] 
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was one of the good things. Some of the neighbors, they were in conflict but when it was 
flooded, they become friends again. Because they were helping each other.” (Migrant 11)
But the main reason to stay, is the hope to be able to earn money as the head of the 
family, or the outlook of even benefiting from the exceptional state in financial terms:
“If it would flood again, I would live here alone […] I’m able to ride a boat. I will change 
my job from the motorcycle taxi to a boat taxi. During the flooding, there were a lot of 
people working like this. They could earn about 1.000 Baht a day […] I think I will move 
my children and my wife to my hometown, because they can stay and it’s not difficult 
and sometimes, they can earn money at my hometown as well, even though it is little 
money.” (Migrant 7)
“If it does flood again, I want to live here. I want to earn money. If I go back to the South, 
I will have no money left like the last time. Because when I go back […] I have nothing 
to do. [But] I will need help from the government, when it floods again. I need someone 
help me send my children back to my home, especially the young children who cannot 
work and help themselves.” (Migrant 5)
Although many envisage further floodings in the near future, those plans didn’t transla-
te into concrete actions by now, but are supposed to be implemented right before the 
next disaster. Although individual adaptation measures in general were rather low to 
date, most of the interviewees believe to be better prepared for future floods and are 
able to decrease loss and damage. However, temporary migration to hometown still 
seem to be the best option for many:
“I’m not worried, because I now bought a house that is on higher land. And I will res-
pond quicker than last time. I’ll move my stuff before flooding and escape before the 
water is coming.” (Migrant 13)
“This house [I’m living now] is a newly developed house and the company already used 
more soil to elevate it. […] [But] I think I will go back home anyways, because my parents 
worry about me.” (Migrant 1)
 
5. Discussion 
 
The flood of 2011 was a slowly enrolling danger for Central Thailand. This compound 
disaster – heavy rainfall coupled with water mismanagement and failed disaster ma-
nagement coordination – was an unpredictable threat for the residents of the BMR. In 
2011, Thailand sensed a loss of control at various levels. By focusing on coping strate-
gies of internal migrants living in Salaya, BMR, this study seeks to explore perceptions 
of persons who were unfamiliar with urban flood disasters back then. In doing so, the 
study contributes to the relevant discussion about ongoing migration-inflows into risky 
regions and increasing environmental hazards.
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As a disaster without locally identifiable natural signs, the water masses broke in on 
the residents of Salaya. Although Thailand has already been in an exceptional state, all 
of the interviewed migrants misjudged or underestimated the situation. As shown and 
in accordance with Müller-Mahn and Everts (2013), riskscapes of the upcoming hazard 
were not only constructed by former experiences with flood disasters, but also informed 
by locality characteristics. Firstly, experiences made in home provinces and other parts 
of Thailand served as frame of reference and crucially influenced the actions taken. In 
doing so, the interviewees can be divided into two groups accordingly to geographical 
origin: highly flood experienced migrants from flood-prone areas in the South, and less, 
or “non-flood” experienced from the rest of Thailand. Secondly, Salaya, the new habitat, 
created distinct riskscapes by its own flood history. Since for most of the interviewed 
migrants the floods of 2011 was the first they have experienced in Salaya, they couldn’t 
refer to any existing knowledge on flood proceedings in this particular habitat and re-
lied on stories and learned from reactions of other inhabitants. And thirdly, the migrants’ 
connectedness with places outside of Salaya affected the migrants risk awareness by 
worried relatives, who themselves depended on second source data such as the media 
and information available on the Internet. 
Migrants without any flood experiences had most difficulties in dealing with the situa-
tion. In the lack of own experiences, their understanding of the risk strongly depended 
on external information (Wachinger et al., 2013), which have not been reliable due to 
the lack of a coordinated disaster management plan. Nevertheless, experiences alone 
haven’t proved a recipe for being spared from misjudgment and subsequent losses and 
damages, since they could even trivialize the disaster, e.g. in comparing it with annually 
natural phenomenon (Chomsri & Sherer, 2013) in South Thailand or even with the cata-
strophic tsunami of 2004.
But regardless the geographical and experiential background, coping measures have 
been similar and consisted of movements (Bravi et al., 2017): in-situ and translocally. 
Besides securing belongings at elevated levels, moving out of harm’s way has been the 
most prominent coping strategy, at the latest when livelihoods couldn’t be sustained 
anymore. Thereby, the migrants were able to count on their kinship in their (not directly 
affected) home provinces. By escaping to hometowns, the places of origin have been 
the most important shelters. By going home, the internal migrants travelled long dis-
tances, which was notably different to documented reactions of locales as Chomsri and 
Sherer (2013) highlight, whose interviewees stayed to their homes as close as possible. 
Due to the poor disaster management by the government, lots of people were left to 
their own resources and finding shelter depended strongly on social networks (Choms-
ri & Sherer, 2013). Phongsathorn (2012) describes how displacement directed towards 
shelters was dependent on social and financial capacities. Our study suggests that finan-
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cial worries restricted people to evacuate in the first place only, and not to distance. It 
became further apparent, that the migrants’ networks outside of Salaya were still intact. 
Although community networks in urban settings during the floods of 2011 haven’t been 
as distinct as in rural areas (World Bank, 2012), we indeed found collaborative behavi-
or between Salaya’s internal migrants. Nevertheless, translocal networks in rural areas 
have been much more important. Being embedded in those, internal migrants have an 
additional social asset, which the local community might not have. Further, knowing 
what kind of living conditions to expect in their hometowns could have made it easier 
for internal migrants to leave their new homes temporarily (Heijmans, 2001). Neverthe-
less, it also became visible, that relocating to the BMR implied leaving the labor market 
in the original community. Except of those migrants who are migrating seasonally, they 
weren’t able to earn money in their hometowns and had to live on their savings, or recei-
ved financial support from their network. 
Besides social and monetary resources, escaping the hazardous zone depends on 
whether the urban infrastructure such as train tracks and roads are operational. Thus, for 
truly being an asset in disastrous situations, translocality is dependent on functioning 
structures that connect the locales, in physical and social manner. 
Gaining knowledge about the flood in Salaya in 2011, many migrants now feel confident 
in staying, if Salaya is affected again in the future. Riskscapes have been adjusted to 
the hazardous characteristics of urban flood disasters and adaptation measures accor-
dingly. Financial concerns were thereby some of the most important drivers that would 
make many of the interviewees stay. Learning that many inhabitants managed to live 
with the waters, in retrospect, evacuating was not a decision they were fully satisfied 
with anymore. Besides those who voluntarily want to or being forced to stay, many are 
still planning with their translocal resources in order to escape eventually. Evacuation in 
form of temporary migration to hometowns turns thereby from a solely coping strategy 
in 2011 into an adaptation strategy that is counted on in the future.
6. Conclusion
Migration to risky zones such as deltaic metropolises involves the danger of being con-
fronted with unfamiliar environmental hazards. Even adaptations to a seemingly similar 
hazard can appear of being inappropriate in a new setting. Floods in highly urbanized 
areas not only physically proceed very differently than in rural ones, where retention 
areas are available, the soil is more absorptive, the duration is more or less predictable, 
and flood water less contaminated. But also in a social manner, when urban centers are 
given priority in protection measures to the periphery, creating uneven vulnerabilities 
along the residents. The compound flood disaster of 2011 in Thailand had the biggest 
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impact on the fast growing BMR. Focusing on internal migrants in one highly affected 
neighborhood revealed that in the lack of local flood knowledge, riskscapes were cons-
tructed accordingly to different locality characteristics, namely by former flood experi-
ences in old homes, by the believed safeness of the new habitat and by social translocal 
influences. The uncontrollable character of this natural-manmade disaster made mo-
bility the most viable coping strategy. Translocal structures of networks in hometowns 
have thereby proven to be a valuable coping resource to environmental disruption in 
places of migration destination. Were hazardous forces in 2011 the cause of temporary 
out-migration, outweighs for many the hope of maintaining livelihoods during a poten-
tial future flood disaster in the meanwhile. Thanks to adjusted knowledge about urban 
floods, migration to translocal networks becomes on the other hand a strategy which is 
planned with and therefore constitutes a form of adaptation.
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